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Abstract—When detecting phishing websites, both humans and
computers rely on aspects of the website (features) to aid in their
decision making. In this work, we conduct a review of URL-based
phishing features that appear in publications targeting human-
facing and automated anti-phishing approaches. We focus on both
humans and computers to obtain a more comprehensive feature
list and create a cross-community foundation for future research.
We reviewed 94 papers and categorise their features into: lexical,
host, rank, redirection, certificate, search engine, and black/white
lists. We find that research on automation has used all feature
categories but several, such as host-based features (e.g. DNS), are
minimally explored in human-facing anti-phishing research.
Index Terms—Phishing, Phishing features, Phishing Education,
Usable security
I. INTRODUCTION
Phishing, where users are tricked into giving away valuable
data, is not only expensive [1], it is also hard for both humans
and computers to detect accurately [2, 3]. After all, the goal
of a phisher is to first get their message to users by bypassing
automated detection systems, and then deceive users into
interacting with the message. However, while phishers can ma-
nipulate many aspects of their communications, there are a few
aspects that are very challenging for them to fully hide, such as
the destination of URLs (Universal Resource Locators). In this
paper, we review phishing research and catalogue URL-based
anti-phishing features aimed at both humans and automated
systems. Our aim is to create a foundation for future research
to improve the state of human-facing support.
Ideally, all phishing detection, URL or otherwise, would
be done automatically without human involvement. But there
are two major challenges to doing so. First, while automatic
detection is impressively accurate with classification rates as
high as 99% [4] and the preferred first line of defence for
most users [5], the remaining 1% is highly problematic and
potentially very damaging [6]. Second, humans are needed to
report and annotate new phishing attacks so that automated
systems can in turn be updated to detect the latest threats.
Effectively, humans label phishing, which is then used to
train automated systems, which in turn causes phishers to
change tactics [7], leading to undetected phishing, which is
then reported by humans, starting the whole cycle over again.
Automatic phishing detection of URLs comes down to
deciding if a URL’s destination, is “bad” or not. For a human,
“bad” can be defined as any website other than the one they
intend on visiting. But computers lack users’ understanding of
context, so they must instead define “bad” based on pre-labeled
lists (/white lists), heuristics (rule-based) [8], and building
machine learning classifiers using labelled examples [9]. This
difference means that humans and computers likely find dif-
ferent features more or less useful when making phishing
judgements. Park et al. conducted a lab study to compare the
abilities of machines and humans to detect phishing emails [2].
They found that humans are as good as machines in labelling
legitimate emails. For phishing emails, some emails were easy
to spot for humans but not machines while others were easier
for machines to detect than humans. They concluded that
a collaboration between machines and humans is needed to
reach an optimal solution to combating phishing.
Since humans are not naturally skilled at detecting phishing,
education and support are used to help them accurately detect
it. Education approaches attempt to train users to look at
specific features of the URL or communication. Examples
include sending fake phishing emails to employees with tar-
geted training [10], training via games [11, 12], dedicated up-
front training, and online advice pages [13]. Some trainings
also include guidance on how to use phishing features to
differentiate between a safe and malicious page. Educating
users takes time, and providing updates to that education
is also very expensive, so theoretically there is a natural
bias towards teaching features that are easier for humans to
understand and that are stable across time.
However, some URLs are impossible for people to read even
if they have high awareness. Punycode (RFC 3492) URLs, for
example, allow Unicode characters to be encoded using ASCII
such that there is no human-visible difference between the real
URL and the malicious one even though the computer would
see a difference. Detecting such problems requires support
systems where the computer extracts and highlights feature
data to support the human in making a decision. Two recent
examples from research are TORPEDO [14] and Faheem [15].
Both of which provide the user with just-in-time information
(features) with the goal of supporting users’ decisions.
In this paper, we explore the literature to answer two
questions: (1) What phishing URL features are used in existing
research? (2) Are the features used in the automated detection
research also explored in human-facing research?
To our knowledge, no prior literature review has considered
https:// Rama:123@www.mail.google.com:8080/mail/u?ID=16225f2f
Protocol
domain Pathname
Subdomain(s) Query StringTLD
Authentication
Username : password
Port
Hostname
Figure 1. Example URL with the standard components labelled
URL-based phishing features in reference to both humans
and computers. Several works have compared automated and
human training approaches [5, 16]–[19]. Two general surveys
looked at automated web phishing detection [20, 21]. Phishing
features used in machine learning solutions were previously
reviewed in [9] (2017) and [22] (2015). Reviews of feature
usage in web content [23, 24] and DNS [25] also exist.
We review of phishing literature from three libraries, com-
piled a list of phishing features, and then group those features
into categories. We find that there are a very large number of
features and that all feature-types have been tried in the auto-
mated detection literature. However, several categorizations of
features have minimal exploration in the human-facing work.
Examples include, host features (i.e. DNS) and page popularity
(i.e. PageRank). We also find that the domain of the URL
is heavily used in human-facing work, but minimally used
(beyond blacklists) in automated work.
II. UNIFORM RESOURCE LOCATOR (URL)
As shown in Figure 1, a URL is made up of a protocol, au-
thentication, hostname, port, pathname and query. These are in
turn made up of smaller components. Hostname, for example,
is made up of the subdomains, domain, and top level domain
(TLD). Only the protocol, and TLD are strictly necessary to
create a working URL, though in practice the domain is also
required. Generally to resolve a URL, the browser uses the
Domain Name System (DNS) to locate the hostname’s IP
Address, then contacts the server using the protocol and port, it
also provides the path, query, and authentication so the server
can “locate” the requested resource.
The phisher wants users to load a page under the phisher’s
control. To do so, the phisher must, for a domain they control,
accurately state protocol, domain, and TLD. This domain/TLD
could be similar to an organisation they wish to impersonate,
but cannot be identical. Subdomains are controlled by the
domain owner, so a phisher can create arbitrary subdomains for
their domain with virtually no oversight. The other elements
(authentication, port, path, and query) can be ignored by the
malicious server, and therefore can contain any syntactically
valid information the phisher wants. The limits placed on the
URL, mean that the domain/TLD is the most accurate in terms
of where the URL will lead, but a phisher can select the
domain to be confusing or put valid-looking URL elements
into the other elements to confuse humans readers [26].
III. METHODOLOGY
Our research goal is to create a representative list of URL
phishing features that have been tested with machines and/or
with humans by reviewing past research papers.
A. Procedure
Literature was collected first using Google Scholar (October
2018), and then ACM Digital Library and the IEEE Xplore
Digital Library (December 2018).
We searched Google Scholar with the keyword “phishing
URL” to look for phishing features. One researcher started
with the publications rated most relevant and reviewed the
title and abstract to make sure the paper matched the inclusion
criteria (Section III-B). They then reviewed the content, mark-
ing any sections that discussed phishing features. Identified
features were then included in a spreadsheet used to track
reviewed papers. They kept reviewing till new papers were no
longer adding meaningfully different phishing features. For
example, the features “count of subdomains” and “count of
dots in hostname” effectively measure the same thing and were
not considered meaningfully different. After completing the
procedure for the first database, the researcher reviewed the
second, and then third databases. A second researcher then
went through each annotated paper and verified that features
had been accurately identified in the paper and the spreadsheet.
Next, we grouped the features into categories. Where
possible, categories were formed and named using common
conventions from reviewed papers. “Lexical Features”, for
example, appears in several papers and always refers to
features extracted from URL text. For each category shown
in Table I, we also summarise key aspects of features such as
how they are used (automatic, human) and limitations to their
use (time, storage, and dependencies).
B. Inclusion/exclusion criteria
We included papers whose primary focus was the determina-
tion of whether a URL would lead to a phishing page without
requiring the loading of the full page content. We focused
on features that detected phishing rather than other attacks,
such as XSS. We excluded papers which were not focused
on URLs, such as those only looking at email content without
also analysing URLs. Poster papers, extended abstracts, theses,
and technical reports were also excluded due to lack or
limited peer-review. We also excluded content-based features
that required the full page to be loaded as our focus is pre-
load. Due to the limited number of papers related human-
facing features, we included any paper that studied people’s
susceptibility to phishing and otherwise met the above criteria.
C. Limitations
Stopping reviewing at saturation limits the scope of the work
and likely results in some features not being included. We
decided to stop at saturation anyway because: 1) there are a
very large number of URL phishing-related papers (∼26,400
Google Scholar results), 2) papers tend to have high overlap in
features used, and 3) the more effective features tend to appear
in multiple papers. However, the result is still a bias toward
well cited papers that closely match our search keywords.
IV. PHISHING FEATURES
Our review identified 94 papers, 58 of which were from
Google Scholar with an overlap of 24 papers in IEEE or ACM.
We categorise identified features into: lexical features, host
features, rank features, redirection features, certificate features,
search engine features, and black/white list features. In this
section, we discuss the primary features for each category and
their use in automated, and human-facing detection methods
in detail. For the features with more than 4 citations we give
an example of the papers use stated those features.
A. URL Lexical Features
Parsing the URL string itself and using the resulting compo-
nents as features is very popular and reliable. Lexical features
are attractive because they require low processing time, low
amounts of data storage, and can be processed without having
to call out other services [27], which is also a nice privacy
feature. As a result, they have high real-time efficiency [28].
Since URLs are unique to a site, they are also impossible to
fully spoof, so while it is possible to create a similar-looking
URL (i.e. pavpal.com or evil.com/paypal) it is not possible
to use the correct URL domain (i.e. paypal.com) in a phishing
URL without first compromising the domain.
Although the use of URL lexical features alone has been
shown to result in high accuracy (∼97%) [29, 30], phishers
have learned how to make predicting a URL destination
difficult by carefully manipulating the URL to evade de-
tection [30]–[32]. Therefore, combining these features with
others, such as host, is the most effective approach [33].
Domain. The domain is a prevalent feature in anti-phishing,
likely because while phishers can register new domains, they
are not generally able to attack a user visiting a legitimate
domain. Extracting the domain is also easy, requiring only
simple URL parsing. But using it alone to classify URLs is
difficult because context, such as where the user wants to go,
is missing. Instead it is combined with other features such as
comparing it to the page title or meta-data [34, 35].
Human education papers commonly teach users how to
parse out the domain as a way of enabling them to compare
the domain to the one they expect to be visiting [12, 36]–[38].
However, people struggle to retain these skills [36].
For the papers using a human-support approach, such as
those discussing SpoofStick and Netcraft, these tools used
the hostname to help users correctly identify the sites they
visit. In other tools, the domain part was pointed out as the
destination [15] or highlighted once the mouse hovered over
the link [14]. However, human-support only works if users
are aware of what the correct domain is. Domains that do
not directly line up with a recognized brand name, such as
www.nytimes.com, can still confuse users even if they can
parse the domain out correctly [15].
Other URL components. As shown in, Figure 1, the
URL standard defines multiple components [39], and while
the hostname is the most commonly used feature, the other
components are also commonly used (e.g. [40]–[43]).
The authentication components, identified by the pres-
ence of ‘@’, appears right after the protocol, making it
an easy place to put a brand name and fool users (i.e.
http://bank.com@evil.com). Authentication components are
rare in legitimate URLs, so nearly all commercial modern
automatic filters use it as a feature (e.g. [4, 44]–[46]).
Some automated detection papers use the existence of
non-standard port numbers as a feature, where standard port
numbers are either a common port number of the associated
number with the protocol (e.g. [47]–[50]) because phishers use
different port number to escape the detection [49]. However,
port numbers are generally rare in URLs (0% in legitimate vs.
0.01% in phishing) [41].
“Non-standard” TLDs are also used as features but there is
no consensus on the definition. Specific country-code TLDs
(ccTLDs), such as ‘.cn’ and ‘.ru’, are used as features [51]
while others focus on whether the TLD is a ccTLDs or a
generic TLD such as ‘.net’ and ‘.com’ is used [52]–[54] and
it is found to be a strong feature for classification (2017) [54].
In [55], ccTLDs are compared to host locations to see if the
owner is located in the same country. Although ccTLDs are
cheaper to obtain and sometimes used in phishing URLs, ‘.org’
was found to be the most popular TLD for phishing websites
in 2014 [7].
Other works apply weights to TLDs based on their training
set [56, 57]. Weighting the features results in TLDs like ‘.info’
and ‘.kr’ being in the top phishing features while ‘.gov’ and
‘.edu’ being in the top legitimate features [57]. A set of 5
TLDs including ‘.com’, ‘.net’, and ‘.org’ are also used [58].
Human-facing approaches have tried teaching users about
URL structure components, such as TLD and authentication,
to enable them to differentiate between the hostname and other
URL components [11, 12, 15, 36]. Faheem [15] warns users
about non-standard port numbers.
Special Characters. The presence of special characters
such as ‘/’, ‘=’, and ‘ ’ is an aspect that has been used in
many papers (e.g. [23, 58]–[60]) along with the frequency of
their appearance [61]. Based on analysis of PhishTank URLs,
77% of phishing hostnames contain special characters [59].
Hyphens are one of the most commonly used features and
the existence of a hyphen symbol, especially in the domain, is
a phishing feature in automated and human-support methods
(e.g. [12, 15, 61, 62]). Hyphens appear in legitimate URLs as
well (2% in legitimate vs. 9% in phishing [40]), so they cannot
be used as an indicator in isolation [28, 59]. Phishing websites
tend to use the hyphen commonly to separate the brand name
from the suffix (TLD) or prefix (i.e. www-paypal.com) [63],
signifying the existence of a hyphen and suffix/prefix in the
domain is a compelling phishing indicator. Other researchers
included the number of hyphens as a feature (e.g. [47, 48, 64,
65]). The maximum number of hyphens in legitimate URLs
hostnames is one while in phishing it is two or more [59].
Interestingly, the feature was one of the insignificant features
in their classifier performance [54].
Dots and slashes are special characters that delineate com-
ponents. Hence, the number of dots is linked to the number
Table I
SUMMARY OF IDENTIFIED FEATURES
Feature Feature Most popular Use of the features Criteria
Category Subcategory feature Automated Human Human Time Storage Dependency
education support
Lexical Domain Domain Low High High Low Low No
Other URL components Authentication High Mid Low Low Low No
Special Characters Number of dots High Low Low Low Low No
Length Length of URL High NA NA Low Low No
Numeric Representation Raw IP address High High Mid Low Low No
Tokens & Keywords Phishing keywords High Low NA Mid Mid No
Deviated domains Similarity with PhishTank High High High Mid Mid No
Embedded URL Low NA Low Low Low Maybe
Host Whois Domain age Mid NA Low Mid Low Yes
DNS No records Mid NA NA Mid Low Yes
Connection Connection speed Mid NA NA Mid Low Yes
Rank Domain Popularity Alexa Rank High NA Low Mid Low Yes
PageRank Google PageRank High NA NA Mid Low Yes
Redirection No. of Redirections Mid NA Low Mid Mid No
Certificate Encryption Is it HTTPS? High Mid Low Low Low No
Certificate values Is EV? Low NA Low Low Low Maybe
Search Engines Query the Full URL Mid High Low Mid Low Yes
Black/White lists Simple List PhishTank High NA Mid Low Low Yes
Proactive List Blacklisting the IP Mid NA Low Mid High Yes
of subdomains and is a strong commonly used indication
of phishing (e.g. [55, 66]–[68]). Analysis of phishing and
legitimate URLs in [40, 41] found the number of dots in
legitimate URL hosts ranges from 1 to 5, where 5 is rarely
found in legitimate URLs, while in phishing URLs it ranges
from 0 to 30. Some papers mark URLs with 3 or more
dots as suspicious [65]. Therefore, the more dots, the more
suspicious the URL [65, 68]. The number of slashes is also a
phishing feature [27, 55, 69] with a threshold of five in some
research [34, 59]. Having a hostname with no dots, consisting
of only a single TLD, was also used as a feature [59].
The hyphen is the only special character used in human
education [11, 12, 62] and human-support [15]. However, since
hyphens only indicate phishing if there are too many of them,
and “too many” is not well defined [41], these features may
not be a good match for future human-facing research.
Length. Attackers tend to use long complex URLs as
another way of hiding the true destination. Length-type (char-
acter count) features are commonly used to detect phishing
URLs. Though, shortened and simple URLs can also be
misclassified based on it [70].
One common feature is the length of the full URL (e.g. [59,
65, 71, 72]). The URL length is one of the features that
contributed best to the classifier performance of [66, 72].
Taking dataset bias into consideration, phishing URLs are
typically longer in publicly available blacklists than non-
phishing URLs which are usually Alexa top sites [73].
Length of other URL components is also used as a feature,
such as the length of the hostname (e.g. [56]–[58, 72]) – on
average 20 characters in legitimate URLs [59], subdomain [48,
55], domain (e.g. [60, 64, 71, 72]), path (e.g. [41, 54, 71, 74]),
or query [75]. The hostname’s length (max 240 in phishing vs.
70 characters in legitimate) was the most useful as compared
to the full URL and path’s lengths [40]. Other features include
average and longest domain and path token length, domain and
path token count (e.g. [53, 54, 56, 64]), length of max-length
in domain name (e.g. [58, 61, 67, 71]).
Human-facing methods in our dataset did not consider the
URL length as a feature; nevertheless, participants in [38] as-
sumed the longer the URL the less secure it was. Alsharnouby
et al. [26] also found that people without training tend to
classify URLs based on their perceived simplicity.
Numeric host representation. Legitimate URLs primarily
use the registered hostname of the website, while phishers
sometimes use different representations of the hostname to
hide the destination. Examples include: IP addresses (i.e.
http://216.58.204.46) (e.g. [68, 76]–[78]), dotless IP ad-
dress (i.e. http://3627733550/) [69], encoded IP address
hex value: (i.e. http://0xd83acc2e) [23, 40, 41, 64, 79],
or even encode the hostname or part of it as Unicode (i.e.
http://%63%6E%2E%63%6F%6D) (e.g. [59, 67, 78, 80]) to make
the URL text difficult to understand [79]. In [59], 65.16% of
phishing URLs contained Unicode. IP addresses are the most
common feature in automated detection and the only numeric
feature used in human-facing detection [12, 14, 15, 62].
Tokens and Keywords. Many automated detection papers
tried tokenizing the URL and treating it as either a bag of
words (e.g. [29, 30, 70, 81]), an N-gram [32, 82], a combina-
tion of tokens and bi-grams [83], or character frequency [46,
47]. The bag of words approach is effective, but the models
are unstable over time and require frequent updating [53, 64].
Common keywords are also looked for in phishing URLs,
such as “secure”, “account”, or “confirm” (e.g. [27, 40, 69,
79]). Similarly, human education has tried teaching users not
to click on URLs with security-related keywords [12, 62].
However, keywords are unstable over time because attackers
adapt and change words [28, 73]. Sananse et al. argue these
features appear in both legitimate and phishing websites [84].
Number and average of terms are used as a feature [54, 59,
66, 72], with >4 terms in the host indicating phishing [59].
Path extension such as ‘.txt’ [52, 53, 85] – attackers can add
scripts to benign websites making ‘.js’ pages more dangerous.
Specific out-of-place URL components can also be a feature.
For example, the presence of two HTTP or HTTPS in the
URL [27, 65], presence of TLD in the domain, subdomain or
path position, such as “cnn.com.malicious.org” (e.g. [28, 65,
78, 86]), or a prefix (i.e. www-chase.com) [8, 48]. Out-of-place
brand names can also be features, such as in the subdomain or
path (e.g. [4, 62, 87, 88]). The NoPhish education game [77]
added the brand name in the subdomain to help users under-
stand phisher tactics. Similarly, in [62], users learn not to click
on long hostnames if they contain part of well-known brand
name. Providing correct parsing of URLs can also help users
learn to read them [15].
Although phishing education research teaches users not to
click on URLs if the domain has unknown terms (unrelated
words) [11, 77], it is challenging to identify arbitrary words
automatically [83]. Some papers attempt to detect random
strings, using methods such as comparing URL tokens to
proper or common nouns [4], or by calculating the string’s
entropy [48, 53]. Nonetheless, URLs are not necessarily con-
structed from proper nouns, as is the case with the New York
Times “www.nytimes.com”. A limitation of this approach is
Internationalized Domain Names (IDNA), which cannot be
detected with these features. Digits in the URL hostname may
indicate randomness and are common in the host of phishing
URLs (30%) compared to trustworthy URLs (3%) [40, 41].
The number or continuity of digits is also looked for in the
host (e.g. [8, 58, 73, 89]) and other URL components [54]. Or
even, the continuity of characters such as letters, digits and
symbols and the number of each [53].
Deviated Domains. Construction of domain names to
mimic legitimate ones is another lexical trick. An approach is
to replace the TLD with a different TLD [88]. UTF8 encoding
can also be used to produce identical-looking characters from
different languages and alphabets, such as replacing the En-
glish ‘b’ with the Russian ‘b’ [90] or using confusing character
combinations such as ‘rn’ for ‘m’ [69].
Prior work computed the similarity of domains and pre-
computed whitelisted domains [55], the target domains pro-
vided by PhishTank (e.g. [45, 60, 72, 91]), Vulnerable Sites
List [60], top Alexa domains [31], and dictionary words [58].
In addition, Garera et al. [79] looked for the brand name in the
domain concatenating with other characters. [66, 72] looked
at if the starting/landing domain appears in, or is a substring
of, the title in full or part. Verma and Dyer [61] also used
features like Euclidean Distance to find deviated domains.
Training approaches teach users to check for spelling mis-
takes letter by letter [11, 62, 77]; however, users are not
good at identifying visually deceptive domain names [12, 26,
36, 37]. For Unicode, human detection games excluded this
feature due to the limitations of humans ability to recognise
the subtle differences [11, 77]. Human-support solutions, such
as Faheem [15], show that providing the user with assistance
by automatically looking for similar popular domains and
unexpected Unicode characters can be quite effective.
Embedded URLs. The query string can also contain a
request for the destination site to forward the user on to another
site. The occurrence of ‘//’ in the query string is used as
a feature in automated detection, however, it was not a top
5 feature [65]. Number of domains combined with TLD is
also a phishing feature [28, 80]. No human education covered
embedded URLs but human-support (TORPEDO) does give
redirection information on mouse over [14].
B. Host Features
Querying community managed data sets, such as DNS, or
reading HTTP headers, can provide many features; such as
domain registration date, where it is hosted and who owns it.
Host-based features increase the overall accuracy [86]. And
comparisons between lexical, host, and rank features found
that host features contribute the most to classification perfor-
mance [56, 83]. However, connecting to DNS or Whois also
requires on average a 1.6 second delay [64] which is time
expensive. Phishers can also avoid presenting accurate host
features by using link shortners, web hosting services [92],
or using compromised accounts so that registrations appear
associated with the compromised account owner and not the
phisher [93]. Some of these avoidances can be themselves used
as features, for example, identifying if the host information is
hosting provider or a link shortening service [92].
Whois Features. Whois is a query protocol that provides
48 features relating to websites [84].
Phishing websites, if they have details at all [34], generally
have recent Whois registration dates, near future expiration
dates, or recent update date (e.g. [51, 57, 60, 89]). While these
three dates are commonly used in research, the domain age
is the most commonly used, with a range of definitions for
“recent” – 2 [93], 3 [94], or 6 months [65, 95]. Fang et al, [95]
found that approximately 95% of the phishing URLs in their
dataset were less than six months old and Hao et al. [96] found
55% of domains appeared the day after they were registered.
Other record information includes geolocation-based fea-
tures, such as the timezone, netspeed [51], physical location
of the country/city [7], or the IP geolocation [57, 71, 97].
Also, the existence of the domain in Whois [65, 89], the
alignment between the URL domain and the domain registered
in Whois [65, 78, 84], the registrars or registrants [60, 64, 67,
71, 86, 97]. Finally, the domain match between Registrar URL
and Registrar Whois Server [84].
Some registrars also operate as hosting providers, some of
which regularly scan their hosted domains for malicious pages
(e.g. GoDaddy [84]) and remove them, while others do not.
One feature is the historical reputation of the hosting provider
associated with the URL.
The Whois based features used in human-support systems
are: the server location by Netcraft [98], site country origin
and length of registration by CallingID [99].
DNS features. Human-friendly hostnames are converted
into IP addresses using DNS, so one common tactic of anti-
phishing groups is to remove records of known phishing sites.
A missing DNS record is a strong phishing feature (e.g. [42,
63, 94, 100]). It maintains information that is used as features,
such as associated IP addresses (host, mail exchange, name
server), Autonomous System number, domain name, sender
policy framework, associated BGP and country code (e.g. [33,
54, 55, 64]), IP address segments [49], time to live (TTL) [55,
57, 69, 71], the number of resolved IP addresses [56, 87],
number of name server and the number of IPs name servers
associated with [87]. Additionally, the ratio of malicious
Autonomous System numbers for the resolved IP address and
Name servers associated with the resolved IPs [87].
DNS record information is used to ensure that sites are
not hosted in a portion of the Internet that is considered
disreputable or known for hosting phishing websites (e.g. [64,
83, 96, 97]). Temporary phishing websites also tend to not
have PTR record values [55, 56].
Although DNS provides helpful information, DNS fluxing
is used to hide the attacker’s identity in an ever-changing
network. To avoid Fluxing, Veni et al. look up the domain
name of a URL and repeat the DNS lookup after TTL [87].
Notably, while using DNS server records is expensive and
may face performance and resource strains [98], requesting the
website after TTL period is prohibitive for real time detection.
No DNS features appeared in the human-facing papers.
Connection Features. Although we exclude full page
download features, features regarding the connection to the
website can contain useful information about the server, such
as the http headers, without requiring a page download. Fields
in the HTTP response headers contain information such as
HTTP status [50, 80], content- type [50], content-length [50,
87] – negative in some phishing websites, and cookies [34, 50]
– some phishing websites store cookies on foreign servers.
Connection speeds [57, 86, 87, 97] are faster on reputable
websites, and also domain lookup tends to be quicker as
popular websites tend to have a local DNS server.
Human-facing papers did not contain connection features.
C. Rank-based Features
Because they are not real websites, phishing sites tend to
have a lower visitor count, and are not commonly linked to by
other sites, resulting in low popularity and a low PageRank.
Domain popularity. Domain popularity is used in several
automated detection systems [66, 101]. For example, Alexa’s
rank is a common feature (e.g. [4, 48, 55, 67]). Alexa produces
this value based on the relative popularity of URLs throughout
the previous three months [43], the threshold for legitimate
URLs is 150k [63, 84], or 300k [43]. Alexa also provides
rank reputation [43, 55]. However, a side-effect of this ranking
system is that it is domain based; therefore, URLs from
services such as link shorteners, and web hosting websites can
still achieve a high popularity [89], shielding malicious agents
using these services. Another metric used is webtraffic [42] or
the popularity ranking of Netcraft [57].
Looking at human-support systems such as Netcraft and
CallingID, we see that they provide site rank based on
the hostname popularity [99]. In our opinion, providing the
hostname popularity will mitigate the problem of free web
hosting domains provided the web host gives each website its
own subdomain thereby creating unique hostnames for each
site. Yang et al. [101] also designed a warning to tell users
about abnormally low website traffic ranks. They argued that
including the concept in the warning design reduces the click-
through rate in automated detection systems.
Page Popularity. Roughly, PageRank is a weighted count
of how many other pages link to this web page, where
the weights are the other pages’ PageRanks. Intuitively, it
measures how many other well-known pages link to this one.
Google’s PageRank is successfully used as a feature in
automated detection (e.g. [28, 42, 43, 79]) where URLs that
are ranked less than 5 are classified as phishing in [84]. Veni
et al. [87] combined the PageRank results from AltaVista,
AllTheWeb, Google, Yahoo, and Ask to get a more accurate
PageRank. Garera et al. [79] used a number of PageRank
features such as, the URL and hostname PageRank, the page
presence in the index of a crawler dataset index [79], or in
Google index [42, 57].
The PageRank is a robust feature since Google updates
it frequently; however, it still produces false positives, and
is recommended to be used in conjunction with other fea-
tures [43, 56]. Another problem with the PageRank is link-
farming where attackers manipulate the rank by increasing the
number of websites that link to the URL [56, 87]. To evade
farming problems, Veni et al. [87] added more features such
as the number of the different links that link to the page, and
whether it is linked to other malicious URLs.
D. Search Engine features
Search engines optimise for finding the website that the user
most wants or expects, given only a small set of keywords.
This behaviour makes search engines an excellent proxy for
what web site a user might expect to see given some contextual
keywords and allows automated systems to identify what
website a phishing attack is trying to mimic, because a search
for the website title will often bring up the real site [43, 55,
68]. Search engines can also be used to spell check a domain
and see if it is a short edit distance from a real one.
Automated detection systems query search engines using
the full URL, domain name, page title with domain name, or
domain name with TLD (e.g. [41, 45, 69, 98]). Varshney et
al. compared the search results of queries containing domain
name, page title, description, and domain name with the page
title [98] and found the page title with the domain name gave
the highest accuracy. Both page title and domain name can be
fetched without needing to load the entire page. A website is
considered to not be phishing if it appears in the top 30 [28]
or top 10 [34, 69] results in a search for its own URL. In
2014, Basnet et al. [40, 41] compared the results of searching
Google, Yahoo and Bing for either the URL or the domain.
They found Google to have the highest accuracy; however,
they still used all three in their phishing classifiers. While the
complexity of querying a search engine is lower than querying
the DNS [98], querying three of them in real time may be too
time intensive.
Google spelling suggestions are used to detect the similarity
between potential phishing domains and popular domains [43,
55, 68]. Another usage of search engines is finding intra-URL
relatedness features, the relatedness between domain with TLD
and the rest of the words in the URL, are used in [45, 102]
using Google Trends and Yahoo Clues. The only limitation in
this feature is the limited number of returned results.
Search engine features are not always consistent and can be
different based on the location of the searcher [84]. This issue
is particularly problematic for automated systems where the
server and the user may not be in the same country.
Human-facing systems tend to advise users that when they
are uncertain about a destination, they should search for it
and select one of the top results as a way of finding the
“correct” website [12, 14, 15]. Using this advice, users are
able to accurately classify URLs [26].
E. Redirection-based Features
Redirection can be identified using the HTTP status code,
page meta-refresh tag, or JavaScript. The latter occurs with
shortened links [7], where URLs with a small number of
characters redirect to longer URLs. These are common in
Twitter phishing URLs [103].
Automated systems can also follow redirection links provid-
ing two features: the initial URL, and the landing URL [104,
105]. However, phishers will sometimes cloak URL redirects,
by checking for features of the user’s system first, and then
deciding which landing page to send them to. Therefore,
other features must also be used. For example, the number
of different domains and IP addresses in the chain [106]. The
number of redirections also indicates phishing URLs [66, 72,
89, 106] and has been used as a phishing feature [106, 107].
URLs with <2 redirections were found to be legitimate, 2− 4
were suspicious, and >4 were considered phishing [107]. The
similarity between the hostname in the URLs in the redirect
chains is also a feature since legitimate URLs typically redirect
to same-domain URLs [66, 72].
For shortened links, Gupta et al. [104] analysed blacklisted
Bitly shortened links. They found several features such as the
time between the shortening and the domain creation, or the
time between the shortening and using the link. The numbers
of redirections has been also shown as a feature in nested
shortened URLs, where 80% of the phishing tweets have at
least one redirection [103].
Humans are unable to identify redirection prior to clicking
without machine support, and even after clicking redirection
can happen so fast that a user cannot see it happening. Some
human-support systems detect redirection for users and show
them the final destination before clicking [14, 15].
F. Certificate-based Features
SSL/TLS is a protocol commonly used for encrypting web
traffic. An initial step of the protocol is for the client’s
browser to fetch the public key certificate from the server.
The certificate is used to validate the pubic key, which in turn
is then used to setup an encrypted connection.
Encryption. Early automation work found that legitimate
URLs usually supported encryption, while phishing URLs
generally did not (e.g. [55, 74, 75, 89]). Since obtaining a valid
certificates cost money, it made some sense that legitimate
sites would be more likely to have them. However, after the
introduction of LetsEncrypt, which provides free certificates
to websites, support for encryption is no longer a significant
phishing feature as both legitimate and phishing sites now have
valid certificates [8, 90].
Similarly, prior advice to end-users was to “look for the lock
icon” which signalled encryption. This is still good security
advice [11, 15], and can impact user decision making [14, 26,
76], but it no longer helps detect phishing.
Certificates values. Values found in the certificate fields,
beyond setting up the encryption, are also used as features.
Torroledo et al. [108] used ∼40 TLS features to classify URLs,
such as the validation level, issuer location, or if it is paid or
free. The certificate start and end date are used in [50, 108].
Trusted certificate authorities, such as Comodo, Symantec,
GoDaddy, GlobalSign and DigiCert [50, 94] are used to judge
the certificate trustworthiness.
Public key certificates can be verified at one of three levels
which range from a simple check that the domain is controlled
by the certificate requester (domain-validate) [50], to the
Extended Validation (EV) certificate which requires the issuer
to perform extensive checks of the identity of the organisation
the certificate is being given to [108]. EV certificates are
effective at proving identity, but they also expensive to obtain,
and many sites do not have them [38, 90].
Most modern browsers show EV certificate information to
end-users by providing the validated organisation’s name in
a green box next to the domain. In a lab study, 19% of par-
ticipants referred to the certificate when deciding safely [26].
However, in our paper set, all certificate-based features shown
to humans required that the page be loaded first except for
Netcraft which provide information on request [38].
G. Black/White List Features
When a URL is labelled as phishing, it is typically added
to a publicly visible blacklist so that other anti-phishing tools
can quickly block it [88].
Simple List. Lists are used in automated detection as a
strong feature due to their low false positive rate – almost
0% for newly observed phishing URLs [7]. Blacklists are
also very efficient. It may take humans a while to label the
URLs as phishing, but once labelled, computers can easily
compare URLs against common blacklists [86, 88], such as
PhishTank [84, 85], Google Safe Browsing (e.g. [69, 85, 104,
109]), VirusTotal [109, 110] or Anubis [109], which can be
accessed via API or even downloaded locally.
Proactive list. Unfortunately, while blacklists are very ac-
curate, they are insufficient to detect all phishing websites [37],
likely because blacklists only contain previously seen URLs.
Prior work utilized the lists to proactively discover unreported
phishing URLs and trustworthy ones [88, 100].
Several approaches have proposed features derived from
blacklists, such as marking a URL as malicious if its domain
matches malicious domains [40, 109, 111]. Or even if its IP
address is on a blacklist [40, 57, 95, 97]. However, blocking
a IP addresses runs the risk of inadvertently blocking good
sites if the phishing site is using a free hosting service, so
features were proposed that compared the URL’s domain to a
pre-computed list of web hosting services; therefore, Prakash
et al. blacklisted an IP address depending on the number of
phishing URLs associated with it [88].
Attackers often reuse phishing kits, therefore, a URL could
have similar pathname (directory) to previously blacklisted
URLs [88, 90, 91, 112]. They also reuse their redirection
servers [106], therefore, another feature is to expand shortened
URLs before adding to the list [40, 106] and also include
URLs in the redirection chain, including HTTP, meta and
JavaScript redirection [88, 100], in the blacklists.
Proactive detection of phishing URLs is computationally
expensive since it requires storage space in the majority of
the features and more time to compare the downloaded list.
Creating whitelists of validated websites is more compli-
cated. Automated systems typically use high-profile popular
sites such as Alexa’s top sites [79] or a customised whitelist
of domains often targeted in phishing attacks [79]. However,
maintaining a comprehensive list of validated URLs is in-
tractable [37]. An alternative solution is to add URLs to a
local whitelist after users visit it [101, 113].
Blacklists are heavily used in human-support systems with
most modern web browsers actively blocking URLs that
appear on popular blacklists. Plugins like Netcraft, as a first
step of defence, also block reported and verified phishing
websites. Similar to CallingID, it also shows the users risk
scores on a coloured scale along with the other phishing
indicators discussed previously [99]. Human-support systems
also leverage user’s awareness of phishing indicators and allow
them to report phishing URLs for labelling and potential
inclusion on blacklists. Cloudmark Anti-Fraud relies solely on
users’ reports and verification to block phishing URLs [99].
V. DISCUSSION
The above described research provides ample opportunities
to improve human-facing approaches, particularly human-
support systems which have the technical ability to leverage
many of the features used by automated approaches and
provide that data to humans in a meaningful way. Below we
discuss some of the more thought-provoking issues.
Shifting effectiveness of features. While many automated
detection papers discussed the effectiveness (weights) of their
features, comparing results is challenging. Effectiveness was
evaluated differently across papers, such as statistically by
comparing the feature prevalence in benign and phishing
URLs [40] or by comparing the classifier accuracy between
different groups of features [56]. Feature effectiveness also
changes based on the data set and the domain [114]. Link
shorteners, for example, are common on social media, but less
so in email communication. So, different features work better
in different situations.
Effectiveness also changed over time as phishing tactics
themselves changed. For example, lexical features like the
number of subdomains are subject to both the current website
design trends and phisher behaviour. The introduction of free
signed certificates by LetsEncrypt also impacted the lock icon
(encryption) phishing feature used by many people.
Balancing “safe” and “phish” data sets. A serious
methodology problem we kept running into was the unbal-
anced selection of data sets to represent safe and phishing
URLs, also noted by [73] who points to [72] as being one of
the only papers to use balanced data sets.
Papers commonly use repositories like PhishTank or Google
Safe Browsing to get phishing URLs. These provide a realistic
view of what users are seeing. PhishTank, in particular, pro-
vides the full raw URL as it was reported. Finding safe URLs
that are representative of a “normal” URL is more challenging.
Many papers use repositories such as Alexa’s top sites or Open
Directory Project (DMOZ). The problem with these data sets
is that they are taken from directory listings and therefore
may not represent the composition of a typical safe URL. For
example, query strings are rarely included in directory listings,
but are very common in say Amazon.com URLs for products.
Essentially, the safe and phish datasets tend to be drawn from
different distributions which brings the true effectiveness of
features, such as length, into question because the source of
the difference is unclear.
Host-obscuring tactics. Many features are dependent on
the ability to accurately extract the URL’s hostname, such as
lexical features and host-based features. Phishers can obscure
the hostname by using link shortening services or redirection
which hide the final destination URL. These tactics impact
the ability of both humans and computers since people can
only see the initial URL and computers must take the extra
step of resolving the URL to get the final destination before
trying to make any predictions. Some research exists on how
to detect and resolve these URLs technically, but minimal
research looks at how people think about redirects, or how
to meaningfully present the information about them.
Exploring human-facing features. Human-education ap-
proaches try to help the user learn to extract phishing features
on their own and interpret them. But humans take time to learn
and teaching them new things is challenging, so it is vital that
human-education approaches require minimal prior knowledge
and be robust with a few false positives. For example, long
URLs and hyphens are bad human-facing features because
they are both found in legitimate and phishing URLs which
may confuse users. Conversely, domains are a good choice
because how the user interacts with them does not change
quickly and they can leverage their knowledge.
We recommend that future work explore the use of automa-
tion features in human-support. While many features cannot
be understood by humans unaided, there is great potential for
human-support soloutions to use them.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the aim of providing a foundation for future research
into human-facing phishing support, we reviewed features
used in the automated, human-education and human-support
phishing detection systems. In total we reviewed 94 papers
and grouped the resulting features into 7 categories including:
lexical, host, rank, redirection, certificate, search engines,
and black\white lists. We found that all feature categories
were used by automated phishing detection, but human-facing
approaches have only evaluated some of them.
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